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Abstract
The central concern of this paper is whether the Semantic Approach to theories has the resources to appropriately capture the core tenets of structural realism. Chakravartty, for example, has argued that a realist notion of correspondence cannot be accommodated without introducing a linguistic component which undermines the Approach itself. We suggest first of all, that this worry can be addressed by an appropriate understanding of the role of language with respect to the Semantic Approach. Secondly, we argue that an appropriately structuralist account of representation can  serve the structural realist’s needs. However, the real challenge, we feel, is whether a core notion of ‘explanatory approximate truth’ can be incorporated into this account and in such a way that the emphasis on structure is retained. The extent to which this challenge can be met is something on which even the authors are divided!
Introduction
Ladyman’s 1998 paper ‘What is Structural Realism’ offered new perspectives to the debate on structural realism. Ladyman adopted Worrall’s (1989) core intuition of responding to the pessimistic meta-induction by appealing to structural continuity across theory change and supplemented this with two new dimensions. It was suggested, on the one hand, that a particularly suitable framework for structural realism would be the Semantic Framework of theories due to its inherent emphasis on mathematical models, or structures. On the other hand, the overall aim of the paper was to develop a realist position that was appropriate for modern physics: the metaphysical implications of quantum mechanics were to be accommodated through the structural reconceptualisation of physical objects. It is important to distinguish these different motivations for Ladyman’s ‘ontic’ structural realism and to appreciate that the connections between them are not completely straightforward​[1]​. In the present paper we shall focus on the potential merits of Ladyman’s suggestion to shift the debate over structural realism to within the framework of the Semantic Approach​[2]​. The central issues here have to do with (a) how to best understand the structuralist character of the Semantic Approach to begin with; and (b) how to appropriate this in order to capture the underlying realist intuition of structural realism. Our discussion will by and large take the form of responding to prevalent arguments against structuralism at both of these levels. 
Let us first briefly review these different strands of thought, beginning with the epistemological motivation which presents the retention of structure as a response to Laudan’s Pessimistic Meta-Induction. The central idea, as is well known, is that although the ontology of theories may change – from light as a wave in the aether to light as an electromagnetic field, to repeat the classic example – the relevant structure is carried over through such changes. Worrall (1989, 1994), for example, appeals to the appearance of formally identical equations in both Fresnel’s and Maxwell’s theory as signifying the relevant kind of structural continuity. The pull of such intuition is strong but it has turned out to be surprisingly difficult to make the central notion of structure precise in a way that satisfies the realist’s requirements.
The original motivation for adopting the semantic approach as the appropriate framework for structural realism was to avoid certain seemingly insurmountable problems faced by the alternative linguistic-axiomatic way of spelling out structural content in terms of Ramsey sentences (‘Newman’s problem’), as well as to tap into the inherent ‘structuralism’ of the semantic approach itself. Although it now seems that the Newman problem can be defused, after all, the second motivation remains strong. Our intention here is to compare these different ways proposed for representing structure—the ‘structuralist’ component of structural realism—and consider the constraints imposed by the realist’s agenda for these different notions of structure (the ‘realist’ component of structural realism). 
Structure
How should the structure of structural realism be represented? In his original presentation of the epistemic version, Worrall was, perhaps understandably, vague about what he meant by ‘structure’. In his original 1989 work, he focussed on logico-mathematical structure, as represented by the relevant mathematical equations. However, this leads to an obvious dilemma: either the logico-mathematical structure is just that, and left uninterpreted, in which case it is hard to see how it can explain a theory’s novel predictive success; or it is understood as appropriately interpreted, in which case, it is ontologically committing and we lose the distinction between structures and objects (or natures) that we started with (Psillos 1999; see also his criticisms in Psillos 2001 and in the paper for this symposium). 
However, more recently, Worrall has advocated a form of Ramseyfication as a way of representing the relevant structure of a theory. The basic idea here is that one simply replaces the theoretical terms of a theory with variables bound by existential quantifiers, like so:

T( t1,…tn, o1,…,om)   (x1),…. (xn)T(x1 ,….xn ; o1, ….om)

It is an interesting question whether this is an adequate representation of theoretical structure, particularly as ‘non-structural’ realists have also helped themselves to the Ramsey sentence to express their ‘non-referential’ form of realism (Cruse & Papineau 2002, Cruse forthcoming). If, however, it is accepted that the Ramsey formulation should be multiply realizable, in the sense that it may be realized by more than one set of objects (something which Lewis, for example, ruled out in his original appropriation of he Ramsey sentence, leading to the insertion of the -operator in front), then one can begin to see how Worrall’s distinction between structure and hidden natures can be captured. Unfortunately, formally accommodating multiple realizability may distort the form of structural realism being represented, so much so that it may not even be counted as a form of realism. Carnap, for example, attempted to accommodate it via the introduction of Hilbert’s -symbol (Psillos 2000), but the resulting account, while structuralist, is hardly realist (Cei and French, forthcoming). The later Lewis, on the other hand, relented and adopted a form of multiple realizability, but expressed at the level of properties, rather than objects. This may be realist but it is not the form of structuralism originally proposed by Worrall.
As is well known, however, this approach is threatened by the infamous Newman problem. As originally posed, the problem is a straightforward formal one: '… given any 'aggregate' A, a system of relations between its members can be found having any assigned structure compatible with the cardinal number of A.' (Newman 1928, p. 140). Hence, the statement 'there exists a system of relations, defined over A, which has the assigned structure' yields information only about the cardinality of A, and , if we know only the structure of the world, then we actually know very little indeed (just the number of elements in our domain). Thus, for any given aggregate, a variety of 'systems of relations' is possible and the problem then is how to justify the choice.
More recently this problem has been discussed in the context of the axiomatic, Ramseyfied framework (Demopoulos and Friedman) and the consensus seems to be that it fundamentally undermines structural realism thus expressed (e.g. Ketland 2004). The consensus is wrong, however, for there are natural ways for the realist to cut down the space of unintended models allegedly trivializing the Ramsey sentence expression of theoretical content (Melia & Saatsi, forthcoming). What needs to be recognized is the scope of predicates to be left outside of Ramseyfication (such as the so-called mixed predicates), as well as the need to take a stand regarding the interpretation of the second-order quantifiers. Having said this, it must be admitted that these natural moves result in a notion of structure which is again significantly different from Worrall’s.
As we indicated in our introduction, Ladyman himself is quite clear in his answer to our initial question: the semantic or model-theoretic approach offers the appropriate representational framework. In particular he advocates the partial structures variant of this approach, which has been applied to a range of issues in the philosophy of science, including the role of models in science and the relationship between mathematics and physics, as well as inter-theory relationships, where these can be represented by means of partial isomorphisms holding between the models (the details are given in Ladyman and French 1999; Bueno, French and Ladyman 2002; da Costa and French 2003, and elsewhere). 
However, although this approach avoids the Newman problem as it is typically represented in the context of the Ramseyfication approach, it cannot so easily escape the underlying issue. In very general terms the problem is that of ruling out unintended models. On the semantic view a relevant class of models is directly presented without recourse to axiomatisation, and this can be done so as to pick out the intended models (in the Löwenhein-Skolem sense). Within such a framework, the Newman problem can be cast in general terms which allow a corresponding challenge to be raised for those who argue that mathematical structures (models) represent the world via a structural relationship such as isomorphism. Indeed, the way the unintended models of the Newman problem are generated in the axiomatic framework begins by assuming the existence of some model (which is empirically adequate and T-cardinality correct) relative to which isomorphic models are then “carved out” of a world domain of right cardinality by using a 1-1 mapping. In the semantic approach, on the other hand, we are directly given a model, a mathematical structure, which is said to stand in some structural relationship to the world. Assume that this structural relationship is isomorphism, say, as the realist might propose. It is meant to be a meaningful, non-trivial matter that there is such relation of isomorphism between the model and the world. But now we can “carve out” a structure-in-extension of any world domain of right cardinality so that this structure is isomorphic to the model, completely trivializing the theoretical content of the statement that the model thus represents the world. So whereas in the syntactic case the worry is about the possibility of a cardinality-correct world always forming a model of the Ramseyfied axiomatised theory, here the worry is expressed in terms of representation: if the model directly presented represents the world by virtue of some purely structural relation of isomorphism (and how else could it represent, being a purely structural entity, a mathematical structure, the argument goes), then there is always such a relation to be had for domains of right cardinality.​[3]​
The model-theoretic reasoning appealed to in order to generate the unintended models of the Newman problem fails in the case of the axiomatic framework due to a misconstrual of theoretical language and misinterpretation of quantifiers, as indicated above. What saves the Ramseyfying structural realist is the fact that the theoretical content captured by her use of Ramseyfication goes well beyond the mere formal, logical structure of the unobservable world​[4]​. What about the corresponding problem in the semantic framework—what over and above the purely structural content of mathematical structure and a structural representation relation is needed to avoid the problem? We shall return to this issue at the end of this paper after we have discussed the notion of representation and the role of language in the semantic approach.
Truth
Let’s turn now to the realist side of structural realism. There is the further concern that whatever formal framework is chosen to represent the structural features, it may not be appropriate for capturing what are deemed to be the core principles of realism. There are at least two worries here. One might argue that in addition to theoretical content structurally expressed we need the standard linguistic correspondence—referring theoretical terms—to properly express our realist beliefs. This worry is independent of the structural realist agenda to escape the pessimistic meta-induction by structurally refining her realist commitment. Regarding this latter motivation there is the further worry that the notion of structure delineated is not explanatory in the appropriate sense of actually explaining the success of past false theories. 
A version of the first worry can be called ‘Chakravartty’s Challenge’, as he has argued that if theories are identified with classes of models, as he takes them to be on the Semantic Approach, then realism cannot even be entertained because there is no way of expressing the requisite sense of correspondence with the world (Chakravartty 2001). Chakravartty’s argument is succinctly encapsulated in the following passage:
‘A model can tell us about the nature of reality only if we are willing to assert that some aspect(s) of the model has a counterpart in reality. That is, if one wishes to be a realist, some sort of explicit statement asserting a correspondence between a description of some aspect of a model and the world is inescapable. This requires the deployment of linguistic formulations, and interpreting these formulations in such a way as to understand what models are telling us about the world is the unavoidable cost of realism. Scientific realism cannot be entertained unless we are willing to associate models with linguistic expressions (such as mathematical formulae) and interpret such expressions in terms of correspondence with the world. In the absence of this kind of assertion, there is no realism. Theories can’t tell us anything substantive about the world unless they employ a language.’ (ibid., pp. 300-331).
Now clearly any realist following the semantic approach faces a fundamental issue which can be expressed in terms of the following dilemma: we want to represent theories in terms of set-theoretic models and we want to say that these theories can be true, in the usual correspondence sense as formalised by Tarski. But the models themselves cannot be regarded as true in this sense since it is precisely their role to satisfy the sentences of the theory in its linguistic formulation. 
This is part of a deeper issue: what is the relationship between, for want of better words, the ‘linguistic’ and the ‘model-theoretic’ within the semantic approach? It seems to be a popular misconception of the semantic view that it says nothing but the following about theories: theories are (with ‘is’ of identity) just structures (models). This impression is perhaps fostered by the assertion that if a theory is to be identified with anything, it is with the relevant class of models (van Fraassen 1989, p. 222).  However, one might follow the more moderate line that to present a theory, we should define its class of models directly (ibid.). It is this which is taken to be Suppes’ essential insight. Of course, this leaves unanswered the question, what is a theory? Here we might adopt a ‘quietist’ view: in scientific practice, scientists present, argue about, draw implications from, explain phenomena with … theories, and whatever these entities are, ontologically (similar to musical compositions perhaps, living in Popper’s World Three, whatever), the issue we are primarily concerned with is what is the most appropriate representation of them for our purposes as philosophers of science (see da Costa and French 2003). 
And, of course, there is more to the semantic approach than pure logico-mathematical structures; after all, we speak of particular models representing the unobservable world behind particular phenomena, we interpret theories by describing the properties and relations the state variables in a model stand for, etc. As a matter of fact the advocates of the semantic approach have never taken theories to be (with ‘is’ of identity) just structures, and representation to be just a structural relation, in the logico-mathematical sense of structure being determined only up to isomorphism. But this “concession” (it’s not really a concession of course, since nothing like that was ever intended…), on the other hand, does not mean that theories are (with ‘is’ of predication) not structures, or that representation is not structural, in some significant sense.
This misconception of the nature of the semantic approach has led Hendry, for example, to insist that, 
‘…in reacting to the received view’s linguistic orientation, the semantic view goes too far in neglecting language, because language is a crucial part of the context that makes it possible to use mathematics to represent’ (2001, p. 229)
Again, the attitude behind such comments may have been encouraged by the remark that '[t]he semantic view of theories makes language largely irrelevant to the subject.' (van Fraassen, op. cit. p. 222). However, what van Fraassen is referring to here is the description of the structure of theories and in attempting to describe this structure the model-theoretic approach offers significant advantages over logico-linguistic formulations. Of course, to present a theory, we must do so in and by language, and this allows a complementary role for language to play in our theory of theories. The question of real interest is, rather, how these complementary roles should be understood and what role is left exclusively to structure. Recognising and insisting on the complementary role of language in science does not immediately yield a need for a novel understanding of theories as ‘complexes of representational media’ (cf. Hendry & Psillos, 2000).
 In particular, our epistemic attitudes – including of course those that separate the realist from the anti-realist – are expressed via belief reports which are sentential in nature. And here the models act as 'possible realisations' which satisfy these sentences and allow truth and, significantly, approximate truth, to be defined. Of course, the fact that belief reports are expressed in terms of sentences does not imply that the objects of the beliefs themselves are sentential in character. From this perspective theories are truth-apt, as far as both the realist and constructive empiricist are concerned. The question, then, is how might these two perspectives – the representational and the epistemic – be reconciled?
One answer is to follow Suppes’ distinction between the 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' characterisations of a theory (1967, pp. 60-62). The former concerns the structure of the theory, and the relationships between theories themselves and between theories and 'the world', understood in terms of that structure. From the 'extrinsic' perspective we regard theories from 'outside' a particular logico-linguistic formulation and it is in this respect that models play a representational role (see da Costa and French op. cit., pp. 29-36).
From the intrinsic perspective, however, theories can be taken to be the objects of epistemic attitudes, and be regarded as true, empirically adequate, approximately true, or whatever. To say that the models themselves can act as such objects is to inappropriately switch from one perspective to the other. Since our epistemic attitudes are expressed by belief reports which are sentential in nature, we must shift to the 'intrinsic' characterisation of theories in order to accommodate them. In these terms, when a model or family of models is used as a representational 'device', as they are by the semantic approach, we can say that the models are 'true' as a 'façon de parler' or 'abuse of language'. From the intrinsic perspective, when we consider the claim ‘I believe theory T to be true’, we must accept that the relevant set of propositions stands for, or represents T, only for the purposes of applying the Tarskian formal machinery. Attempts to extend that form of representation in order to try and capture various features of scientific practice will lead to the sorts of problems that shifting to the semantic approach is supposed to resolve (or avoid). Of course, we can only maintain this dual perspective if we refuse to identify theories with either sets of propositions or classes of models. If we can do that, then we can represent theories in terms of models and still regard them as true in the sense that the realist wants (for more on this see da Costa and French ibid.). 
However, Chakravartty anticipates something like this move. He notes that if theories are held to be distinct from their linguistic formulations, then they themselves are incapable of being truth-apt – only their linguistic descriptions can be true or false. As he notes, an ‘unforgiving critic’ would object that this reduces theories to mere metaphors which can only be good or bad and might insist that whatever a theory is, ontologically, it should be capable of being regarded as true. A more forgiving realist might accept that it is the descriptions of the models, not the models themselves, that are truth-apt but then Chakravartty asks, what has been gained? As far as the realist is concerned, her central interest is correspondence, or something like it, and if we have to resort to linguistic descriptions to be able to express that, why not stick with them in the first place?
The Suppesian distinction is not quite the same as the one Chakravartty has in mind, however. The latter distinguishes theories and their linguistic formulations; the former views theories – whatever they are – from two different perspectives. The realist’s epistemic attitudes can be accommodated within the intrinsic perspective and in particular, as we said, Tarskian formulations of correspondence can be accepted. Thus theories, and models can be regarded as the objects of such attitudes, within this perspective. However, it is not the case that nothing is gained by such a move, since the realist is not only concerned with truth and correspondence. She is also concerned with theory change and inter-theoretical relations in general and those aspects of scientific practice are better captured by the semantic approach. 
Indeed, what is really at issue here is not capturing truth, per se, but approximate truth, in some shape or form, since it is in such terms that the Pessimistic Meta-Induction must ultimately be challenged. Now there have been various proposals for more or less formal accounts of this notion but here we should focus on the fundamental idea of an approximately true theory latching onto reality in respects which are in some sense essential for the derivation / prediction of novel phenomena. It is this sense of approximate truth that is crucial for the realist: since the key argument for realism (namely the No Miracles Argument) relies on a notion of successfulness (and how hard that is allegedly to achieve), the end results of this argument must be qualified by this sense of approximate truth. Putting it bluntly, in the end the realist should only be committed to those elements of theories which are responsible for their successfulness. Of course, this core idea has been articulated in various ways in recent realist literature, from Kitcher’s distinction between working vs. presuppositional posits, to Psillos’s divide et impera move, and, we would insist, Worrall’s structuralist distinction between structure and ‘content’. Psillos, for example, puts it as follows:
…it is enough to show that the theoretical laws and mechanisms which generated the successes of past theories have been retained in our current scientific image. (Psillos, 1999, p. 108)
The basic idea, then, is to show that the success of past science, by and large, did not depend on what we now take to be fundamentally flawed theoretical claims. The crucial question now is how to characterize these ‘stable and invariant elements’, or ‘the theoretical laws and mechanisms’, responsible for successfulness. Obviously the conclusion one reaches with respect to ontological commitment depends on how this question gets answered. For example, a structuralist like Worrall will focus on the formal equations as the ‘stable and invariant elements’, whereas a more traditional realist will want to see continuity at the ontological level as well. If we employ the neutral term ‘theoretical constituents’ to cover both possibilities, then the characterisation of these constituents should (i) explain the theoretical successes; and (ii) show the required level of continuity / correspondence (not necessarily invariance!) in theory change. 
Of course, the question of how to characterise ‘the required level of continuity’ is an interesting one and here the semantic approach might claim an advantage (see da Costa and French 2003, Ch. 6). Broadly speaking the idea is that with theories represented in terms of partial structures one could capture this level of continuity via the partial isomorphisms holding between such structures. At the moment, however, we want to focus on the idea that it is via explanation of successes that these theoretical constituents receive localised evidential support. Now, what exactly does this “explaining the successfulness” amount to? 
As far as the standard realist is concerned, it amounts to an assertion that ‘the ontological commitment is to the theoretical constituents explaining the derivation of those equations’, where these constituents are understood as the unobservables entities of science​[5]​. However, care must be taken here. What features in the relevant derivations are the theoretical properties, such as charge, spin etc. and it is these that are being referred to, not entities themselves, conceived metaphysically as objects, since, of course, scientific equations do not encode metaphysics. Furthermore, to see exactly which properties are actually ‘fuelling the derivation’ we should consider in detail the classic example of theory change from Fresnel to Maxwell, where the crucial observation is that the equations derived from Maxwell’s equations using continuity principles at the dielectric interface are formally identical to those derived by Fresnel from his mechanical principles. It turns out that one can derive these equations on the basis of metaphysically minimal premises which assume very little about the properties concerned (Saatsi forthcoming). The core of this analysis lies in the claim that the abstract continuity principles fuelling Fresnel’s derivation define dispositional descriptions (of properties) that are satisfied by the properties E and B in the solutions of Maxwell’s equations. It is these principles describing higher-order properties of E and B which are central to the explanatory endeavour. 
Could not the structural realist simply incorporate such principles into her view? It is certainly not at all clear that Worrall can, since his analysis of this case study suggests that he takes the formal, or syntactic structure of the retained equations of Fresnel’s theory to latch onto reality, or onto the relations between ‘optical phenomena’:
It wasn’t, then just that Fresnel’s theory happened to make certain correct predictions; it made them because it had accurately identified certain relations between optical phenomena (1996, p. 159). 
But there doesn’t seem to be anything in principle preventing the structuralist from incorporating the genuinely explanatory continuity principles identified in this case study and understanding them as representing relations not between phenomena but between unobservable properties of light. Indeed, Worrall himself also states that 
None the less, Fresnel was quite right not just about a whole range of optical phenomena, but right that these phenomena depend on something or other that undergoes periodic change at right angles to the light (1996, p. 159; cf. also Worrall 1994)
Although it can be shown that the oscillatory nature of light actually plays no role in the explanation of Fresnel’s derivation, we can agree with the spirit of this proposition. However, at this point Psillos’ criticism regarding the tenability of the alleged nature-structure distinction intrudes: the relations in question tell us something about the relevant properties hence about the nature of the explanatory theoretical posit in question. Here the simmering tensions between the current authors erupt: one of us (I’ll leave you to guess which) questions the ‘hence’. If the ‘nature’ of theoretical posits is cashed out in metaphysical terms – as it should be if standard realism is not to be a kind of ‘ersatz’ realism (Ladyman 1998) – then the conclusion doesn’t follow. If it is not, then ‘nature’ signifies nothing more than the relevant properties and the conclusion is empty. And in that case the structuralist can agree that the relations tell us something about the relevant properties, understood as aspects of structure. The other insists that if we buy into Psillos’s criticism then Worrall’s position collapses into a different form of realism which has ‘explanatory approximate truth’ at its heart and if this is a species of structuralism it is only so in a rather attenuated sense of the word. What is doing the philosophical work – vis-à-vis NMA and approximate truth – he insists, is certainly not something ‘purely structural’. 
This brings us back to the central concern of this section: is it the case that taking into account the complementary role of language in theorising renders the semantic view of theories essentially non-structural? Well, it depends what is meant by the question. If the question is whether the semantic view collapses into some syntactic view of theories which it is typically compared to, then the answer is no. The structuralism of the semantic approach resides in its insightful emphasis on the structural complement of theories vis-à-vis the question of theory identity, inter-theory relations and theory-data relations. Questions regarding these are nicely handled in a decidedly structural, holistic manner by focusing on the structural description of the variables open to interpretational descriptions. To present a theory is to present these structures directly, not through some syntactic axiomatic partially interpreted system. Some say that the advocators of the semantic approach have understated the role of language in their expositions. This may even be true to an extent. But equally well, those who have reacted in this way to the structuralist emphasis of the semantic view seem to have missed the exact questions which the semantic view attempts to answer.
On the other hand, if the question is whether theories tell us only about the structure of the world, then the answer is yes. The semantic view is not by itself, a vehicle for structural realism. And it was never meant to be. The semantic view is a form of structuralism about theories, emphasising the role of structures in both our representation of theories and their representation of the world. Structural realism, on the other hand, is the view that our best theories represent the world “approximately right”, where approximately right is spelled out by a structural version of EAT. Developing this realist position within the semantic approach is motivated by the possibility of acquiring a level of independence from the linguistic referential matters by somehow incorporating the notion of explanatory approximate truth into the appropriate structural notion of representation. Hence, whether or not the word ‘electron’ refers, the relevant models of the electron theory have the right structural relationship to the unobservable world to explain the success the theory. To motivate this idea any further we need take a stand with respect to issues of representation in the semantic approach. 
Representation
Here we want to focus on the idea that a robust notion of representation can provide the requisite connection between theories – conceived of model-theoretically – and the world and that some understanding of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ representations can appropriately underpin the realist’s epistemic attitudes.
There has been a resurgence of interest in this notion, thanks to the work of van Fraassen, Giere, Suarez and others. In approaching it, we have been urged to keep two issues separate: first, what is it that constitutes the representational relationship? Secondly, what makes a good (or better) representation? (see Morrison 2004, Callendar and Cohen forthcoming). With regard to the first, given what we have said above, we might replace it with: how can we best ‘represent’ this relationship within the philosophy of science?​[6]​ To a large extent, the answer will depend on how one has chosen to represent theories and models in the first place. Logico-linguistic accounts of theories incorporate logico-linguistic views of representation and it is precisely here that we see the danger of the philosophy of science degenerating into a branch of the philosophy of language (we recall van Fraassen’s admonitions on this point). Shifting to an alternative account of theories drags along with it an alternative framework for capturing representation. What is important to note here is that the relationship between the relevant aspects of theories, models, etc. and the world which was previously understood in terms of correspondence and reference, is now articulated in terms of the relevant model-theoretic mappings.
Within such an account, views may still differ of course. Thus Hughes, an adherent to the semantic approach, has adopted a general notion of ‘denotation’, following Goodman and Duhem, when it comes to the relationship between the sign and the signified (Hughes 1997). Although few would deny that if there is to be a mapping between a model and a system, then in some general sense the terms and relations of the former must ‘denote’ the objects and relations of the latter, such a general account may simply be too coarse-grained to capture the particular features of scientific representation. According to Peircean accounts there are three kinds of relation between representations and what they represent, corresponding to three kinds of signs: the iconic, in which the representation ‘resembles’, in some sense, the represented object (examples here would be works of art, diagrams and, we would insist, scientific theories);  the indexical, in which the representation is caused by the represented object (examples include barometers, the symptoms of disease) and the symbolic, for which the relationship is conventional (as in (Western European) languages). It is the first that we are interested in here.
One way of capturing this iconic aspect of scientific representation, of course, is via the formal notion of an isomorphism holding between the model and the system (van Fraassen 1994, 2002). Such accounts have not fared too well in recent discussions, although both the overall framework and details of the criticisms can be questioned. In particular, both sides in the debate help themselves to arguments and examples from the philosophy of art, as if these can all be simply and unproblematically imported into the philosophy of science. Thus Goodmanian arguments against resemblance in the former have been deployed against isomorphism in the latter. But it should give us pause, at the very least, when we note that the likes of Budd, for example, have adopted an isomorphic approach to representation within the philosophy of art (Budd 1999). Even so, there are significant differences between this application and those we find in the philosophy of science. For one thing, in Budd’s approach the isomorphism holds between the structure of the painting’s surface and the structure of the viewer’s ‘visual field representation’ of the relevant object (see also French 2003). This latter aspect allows Budd to accommodate features in artworks such as Holbein’s famous anamorphic skull in The Ambassadors, for example. This points to one way in which the structures which stand in the representational relationship may be different in art and in science. 
Budd himself is dismissive of the standard Goodmanian worries that resemblance or isomorphism cannot capture the inherent asymmetry that holds between the representation and that which it represents. These worries have been carried over into the philosophy of science by those who argue that isomorphism cannot be sufficient for scientific representation (Suarez 2003, Frigg 2002) and that some intentional aspect must be constitutive of the relationship. This has been taken to undermine not only formal approaches to representation but naturalistic accounts in general. Leaving aside the question of what from of naturalism is being presupposed here, the claim that isomorphism is not sufficient for representation may perhaps obscure what is really at issue. Consider, first of all, the image of a face on the beach, etched in the sand by the wind and the sea. We would not be inclined to take this as representational because, it is claimed, the appropriate intention was not involved. But here the intention is involved in the construction of the representation as an object – that is, the relatum, not the relation itself. We dismiss the face in the sand as a representation not because of some deficiency in the representational relationship per se, but because without the relevant intention it does not even count as an artistic object. Compare that with Einstein’s field equations carved into the sand, Would we be so inclined to dismiss these markings as representational? Must the relevant intention be involved for such markings to count as a scientific theory? Our unease about the appropriateness of the very question speaks again to the difference between paintings and theories, between the representational relata in art and science.
Consider again Holbein’s The Ambassadors, for example, recently used by the National Gallery in London to exemplify the importance of the relevant historical context. It might seem obvious that in order to answer the question ‘what does The Ambassadors represent?’ we need at least a working knowledge of 16th century history, of the politics of the time, of attitudes towards science, religion, death and so forth, so that we can appreciate that the lyre with the broken string represents disharmony in the world and that, crucially for this painting, the bizarre anamorphic skull represents mortality. However, to the ten year old, bored and waiting for her parents, the painting represents a pair of princes and the skull is that of someone they murdered, partly hidden by the artist to only indicate their guilt; to the physics student with no background in the history of art, it represents a pair of shopkeepers setting out their various wares and the skull is nothing more than a fancy display of technical skill; and so on. The artwork enters into a multiplicity of representational relationships and the artist’s intentions are then drawn upon to pick out one of these as the ‘right’ one, at least by those with realist inclinations. But this takes us to the second question and the point was just to suggest that intention is not invoked as a constitutive aspect of the representational relationship per se but in order to pick out one such relationship over the others.
Similarly, adherents of the Semantic Approach have faced the criticism that the issue is not that of formally establishing isomorphisms between models and other models or between models and systems but rather that of ruling out those which are uninteresting from the multiplicity of relationships (Collier 1992, pp. 294-295). To characterise this approach in such a way that it is seen as a flaw to appeal to non-formal factors in picking out the desired isomorphism is to construct a straw position. When it comes to inter-theory or inter-model relationships, for example, it seems uncontentious to us that heuristic factors should be appealed to in order to rule out but the uninteresting relationships (da Costa and French 2003; Ch. 6). This line can be extended to Pincock’s argument (Pincock forthcoming) that the Semantic Approach cannot accommodate the way in which scientists may prefer certain idealisations over others, even though such idealisations are equivalent in model-theoretic terms. A similar response can be given: that additional factors must be adduced having to do with the relationship of those idealisations to the relevant background theories. This is just to acknowledge what we can expect from a formal representation and to cast structuralism in general in purist terms is to burden it with expectations which it was never intended to fulfil. We shall return to this point below.
Getting back to the issue of representation, we are typically even less inclined to invoke Einstein's intentions in order to settle the issue of what the theory of special relativity represents, for example. As far as (the early) Einstein himself was concerned it was the behaviour of rods and clocks; for the substantivalist, it is the nature of Minkowski space-time. The choice of system represented, and thus the choice of one relationship out of the multiplicity, is determined by other factors, well known from the realist-antirealist debate. Of course, as far as the anti-realist is concerned such factors are going to be pragmatic at best. When it comes to what a theory is supposed to represent – when it comes, that is, to the issue of interpretation – the constructive empiricist is perfectly happy to accept the multiplicity of representational relationships. Echoing Eco, van Fraassen imports aspects of literary criticism into the philosophy of science, comparing scientific theories to the ‘open texts’ of ‘genuine’ literature which allow for this multiplicity of interpretations. Of course the analogy cannot be taken too far, and both as fans of ‘genre’ fiction, with its ‘closed texts’ and as realists, we’re happy to see this multiplicity whittled down. 
Of course, theories and models are ‘open’ in a way that paintings and books are not (or at least, not obviously) – namely in a diachronic sense. Books and paintings do not change, evolve or progress in the way that theories do and which leads to the issues of theory individuation that Suppe, for example, has long highlighted. That artworks can, in general, be individuated so much more straightforwardly than theories or models is perhaps the most fundamental difference between the two kinds of objects. And, of course, it is this openness which the partial structures variant of the Semantic Approach claims to accommodate (da Costa and French 2003; Bueno et. al. 2003). Not surprisingly, then, it has been suggested that the representational relationship is most appropriately captured in terms of partial isomorphisms holding between the models and the systems (French 2003). Indeed, we can conduct the traffic in concepts in the other direction and extend Budd’s account via the introduction of partial structures, with partial isomorphisms capturing, in particular, the way certain kinds of abstract art can still be said to represent. Most notably, perhaps, it has been argued that this framework can accommodate inconsistent systems such as, on the artistic side, Escher’s works, and on the scientific, Bohr’s theory of the atom, for example (French ibid.). Thus even inconsistency has a representational aspect, something which Callendar and Cohen, for example, seem to find bizarre, but which seems to us to be significant. More importantly, perhaps, partial isomorphism offers a way of accommodating the fundamental asymmetry of representation (Bueno and French forthcoming).
It has also been claimed that isomorphism is not even necessary for representation. Such claims have been defended by, again, drawing on examples from the history of art for which there is either no one-to-one relationship between the artwork and what it represents, as in the case of Picasso’s Guernica or there is no and was never was any intention of representing, as (apparently but contentiously) in the case of Mondrian’s Diagonal Composition. However, it is not at all clear that such examples are decisive even when it comes to accounts of representation within the philosophy of art. Budd’s isomorphism based approach apparently accommodates examples of abstract art, such as Picasso’s Head of a Girl (op. cit.) and, it is claimed, introducing partial isomorphisms allows this approach to cover the other examples as well (French op. cit; for a critical response, see Suarez). 
More importantly perhaps, it is not at all clear that such examples can be imported straightforwardly into the philosophy of science. Are there any examples of scientific theories sufficiently similar to Guernica or Diagonal Composition? Are there any examples of theories which were never intended to represent? The question seems bizarre; even with highly idealised elements a theory represents something, even only in some possible world! Of course, one might construe theories as non-representational, from a particular philosophical perspective. Thus Suarez has suggested that models represent, because they effectively embody the relevant intentions, whereas theories do not, and hence bear comparison to examples such as Mondrian’s work (Suarez 2002). The central idea is that when a model is presented, its intended use is given either implicitly or explicitly by referring to the relevant system, but a theory’s intended uses are not given in this manner. However, it is not clear to us that there are sufficient differences in either the construction or nature of theories and models to support this distinction when it comes to representation. 
Nevertheless, we certainly agree with Suarez when he notes that theories are 'not so tightly linked' to their intended applications as models are and that the discovery of a new application does not fundamentally change the theory in any way. Indeed, that last point was one of the motivations behind the rejection of the Received View's incorporation of correspondence rules. By both tying theories to their applications and, crucially, forming a constitutive part of the theory itself, their inclusion implied that a new application meant a new correspondence rule and, strictly speaking, a new theory​[7]​. According to the model theoretic approach, of course, intended applications are captured by relationships external to the theory itself and we would insist that the same holds for models. Indeed, the heuristic flexibility of models is something that is being increasingly studied, with well-known examples from solid state physics (Bailer-Jones forthcoming). 
Of course, issues of identity and individuality of models arise here as well. As in the case of correspondence rules, if the intended application is a constitutive part of a model, then if the application changes, then strictly speaking so does the model. Suarez would probably agree that indeed it does, insisting that to be a model is to be a model of a particular system. We are not convinced that things are quite so hard and fast. While it is true that some models are very specific and have a tightly constrained application, others are, as we have indicated, more flexible or ‘plastic’ and in practice are referred to as the same model even though the domain of application has changed. Thus we prefer to think in terms of a spectrum, from highly specific to more general types of models and shading over into ‘fundamental theories’, rather than imposing a hard and fast distinction. Indeed, even in the case of the highest level theory we would resist the claim that it is non-representational since, as in the case of Mondrian’s paintings, one could argue – as did Mondrian himself – that what such theories represent are very general structures. A structuralist, of course, would be very happy with this, insisting that what quantum mechanics represents, for example, are the general features of the quantum structure of the world, something which Worrall, in his original paper, hoped would be spelled out in the context of his structural realism. 
The differences between the various stages of this spectrum from the specific to the more general are then captured by these external relationships. A given model may engage in a variety of possible representational relationships, some more than others, and factors external to the model itself then effectively select a particular such relationship which both delineates the relevant application and specifies a particular representation. This allows for the identity and individuality of models (and theories) to be more fluid and open-ended and accommodates their ‘heuristic plasticity’ (to borrow Saunders’ phrase) as touched on above.
The kinds of concern we have expressed here, with regard to the differences between artistic objects and scientific theories also bear on Callendar and Cohen’s declaration of ‘a plague on all your houses’, as they attack both sides of this debate from a Gricean standpoint. The central idea is that scientific representation is just a special case of a general notion of representation for which there are well-known accounts drawn from the philosophy of mind. Thus they insist that,
… we don’t need separate theories of representation to account for artistic representation, linguistic representation, scientific representation, culinary representation, and so on, but rather that all these sorts of representation can be explained (in a unified way) as deriving from some more fundamental sorts of representations, which are typically taken to be mental states. (Callendar and Cohen forthcoming, p. 7)
And representation via mental states is then described on independent grounds. Now, one could dispute the Gricean framework here, or tackle the accounts of representation in the philosophy of mind, or even reject the very idea that the philosophy of mind has anything useful to say on this particular matter. But this is all a bit of a red herring, for Gricean accounts of representation sit perfectly comfortably with – some might even say, underpin – the sorts of Peircean accounts we have briefly outlined above. Our interest lies with this level so we really don’t care if a Gricean framework is adopted or not; what is important is to note the differences between iconic and symbolic representations, for example (and a failure to do so leads to Callendar and Cohen presenting a road sign warning as a putative counter-example to the isomorphism account). Furthermore, within the sub-category of iconic representations there appear to be differences between works of art and scientific theories, as we have seen, which bear on the issue of the nature of the representational relationship (that is, how one cashes out the ‘resemblance’) and that is what we are interested in, rather than some reductionist underpinning which is too coarse grained to allow us to analyse such differences. Given such differences we do need separate theories of representation, simply because of the different natures of the representations themselves.
Finally, let us turn our attention back to the Newman problem, in order to reconsider it in the light of what we have said so far. In particular, we want to emphasise the dangers involved in casting both the Semantic Approach and structuralism in general in a purist light. 
Newman Revisited
We recall van Fraassen’s comment on models and representation:
…in science models are used to represent nature, used by us, and of the many possible ways to use them, the actual way matters and fixes the relevant relation between model and nature—relevant, that is, to the evaluation as well as application of that theory. (1997, p. 523)
This can be interpreted as his preferred answer to the Newman problem as presented above, and it is indeed thus interpreted by Hendry (2001). Hendry finds it interesting that van Fraassen is forced to ‘qualify’ his pure structuralism by bringing in some sort of contextualism. But what is this “pure structuralism” just referred to? As we have indicated, it is something of a ‘straw’ position and as soon as we acknowledge and incorporate the complementary role of language, the concerns about qualifying structuralism, or introducing non-structural elements dissolve. 
	With this in mind, we can respond to Hendry’s introduction of linguistic context as a way around the Newman problem:
To dissolve the Newman problem, we note that equations are offered not in isolation, but in conjunction of text or speech. This linguistic context is what determines their denotation, and serves to make representation a determinate, non-stipulative relation that may admit of (degrees of ) non-trivial success or failure. … we can understand how equations can represent if they borrow reference from this linguistic context.  … When equations are introduced, a mathematical entity like a vector comes to represent a physical quantity like an electric or magnetic field strength, and that particular relation-instance of representation is no more mysterious than, and is determined in precisely the same way as, the reference of the words ‘electric field strength’. (2001, p. 229)
There are a number of things one can say about the ideas expressed in the above quote. For example, it is perhaps not very helpful to explain that equations embedded in a science text ‘borrow reference’ from their linguistic surroundings, when speaking of representation of models in the semantic view. These models are, of course, described by equations but the models themselves are abstract entities not embedded in any text. And how a particular mathematical state-space structure of electromagnetism, say, represents is not in any obvious way determined in exactly the same way as the reference of the words ‘electric field strength’; we can give the usual causal-descriptive account of the latter, but it is not clear how this would go in the case of the former. More importantly, Hendry draws the following general conclusions:
Firstly, representation cannot be identified with isomorphism, because there are just too many relation-instances of isomorphism. Secondly, a particular relation-instance of isomorphism is a case of representation only in the context of a scheme of use that fixes what is to be related to what, and how. (op.cit.)
Is there anything here to which the advocate of the semantic approach would object? It is indeed the linguistic complement of the semantic framework that allows us to side-step the problem of unintended models: the problem is unavoidable in only those ill advised readings of the framework which take there to be only the structural side of the story. But we don’t even know how we could depict anything like our interpreted theories of real science by pure structure, so we take it that in reality there has never been such purely structural view of theories. Here we can apply the above discussion of the complementary role of language:
Let’s begin with a typical characterisation of the notion of structure in the semantic view:
On the semantic conception of theory, structures specify state transitions where states are n-tuples of simultaneous values for the theory’s variables or, in theories like quantum mechanics or natural selection, probability distributions over such values. Realism debates concern the nature of the mapping relationship between theory structure and the world. (Suppe, 1998)
Already in this general statement about theory structure there is a significant element of interpretation. This characterisation obviously only applies to non-relativistic theories, but with this qualification accepted it should be obvious that in the above the domain structured is assumed to be such that it is meaningful to speak of simultaneity and time-wise state-transitions. This already cuts down the number of possible domains that can be represented by a state-space structure thus understood. It is not the case that any unobservable domain of suitable cardinality can be extensionally “carved out” into isomorphic structure in a way that satisfies this constraint on the members of the domain. Yet, provided that this constraint is satisfied, it is meaningful to speak of representing the structure of domain.
Assume now that some such structure is given. Of course, the content represented by that structure is still widely underdetermined: out of any cardinality-correct domain satisfying the above (weak) constraints we can “carve out” a structure-in-extension isomorphic to this. Therefore we cannot say that this structure as such, by itself, has much interesting theoretical content. But of course it doesn’t—we haven’t even specified the field of science under theorising yet! To the general characterisation of theories in terms of state-space structure we must add other information to do this and that information imposes further constraints on the domain that can possibly be represented by the structure. The theoretical variables for which the simultaneous values and their change are given by the structure are theoretically interpreted: they refer to physical properties and relations. It is not the case that all the theoretical content about these variables is encoded in the structure of their interrelations at each moment of simultaneity and over time—there is interpretational content about these properties that is captured linguistically: “the difference in the values of these variables expresses difference in the spatial location of point particles in some reference frame”, etc. This content imposes further constraints on the domain represented, radically cutting down the number of possible isomorphism relations between the model and the modelled. 
It is interesting to notice that the way out of Newman’s problem is very much the same for both the Ramsey sentence and the semantic approach. In both cases we include theoretical content going over and above the pure logico-mathematical structure, linguistically specified (how else?), constraining the possible systems in the world that can be taken to be represented by a Ramsey sentence or a model-theoretic structure. But this “extra” content going over and above pure structure does not rule out the possibility of structural realism, however, since the idea that explanatory approximate truth is spelled out in structural terms does not require purely structural content to begin with. How exactly such a notion is to be developed is still an open question.
Conclusion
We began this paper by considering the different motivations behind Ladyman’s form of structural realism and separating out the issues of the appropriate representation of structure and the appropriate accommodation of the central aspects of realism. As we have indicated, a choice with regard to the former, may drive a decision on the latter. The semantic approach (particularly, we would insist, in the partial structures form), offers a number of advantages when it comes to capturing the epistemic side of structural realism and particularly if we can come up with a robust account of representation. That there is further work to be done almost goes without saying; we hope we have indicated here some possible directions that work might take.
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^1	  In particular, there is an apparent tension between these motivations, insofar as set theory is being proposed as the appropriate framework in which to present a metaphysics that effectively does away with objects. The ways in which one might ease this tension are discussed by one of us elsewhere. (French forthcoming)
^2	  Landry (forthcoming) has suggested that category theory offers a more appropriate framework. Due to space restrictions we shall have to leave the exploration of this suggestion for another time. However, the obvious concern is that even if category theory can be used to address the second of Ladyman’s motivations, it is not at all clear whether it offers the appropriate resources for responding to the pessimistic meta-induction. 
^3	  This problem has been mentioned by Hendry (2001), for example. But it is not quite the same as that expressed by van Fraassen in his discussion of the Newman problem in Structure and Perspective (1997): the problem discussed there as the generalization of the Newman’s problem to the semantic framework is that of one theoretical model potentially representing multiple data models drawn from different domains—an exponential curve (piece of mathematics) standing in the same structural relationship to a data model from physics and biology, say.
^4	   Some may object and claim that that’s what structural realism always meant and hence we shouldn’t use the word ‘structural realism’ any more. But it is very hard-headed to insist that there is only one meaningful and useful sense of the word structure.
^5	  For the sense of explanation involved, see Saatsi (forthcoming).
^6	  Of course we must keep our levels distinct: at the object level, the relationship holds between theories/models and the world/system; at the meta-level it holds between various formal or informal devices (typically mathematical objects such as set-theoretical structures) and various aspects of scientific practice.
^7	  The structuralist wing of the model theoretic approach has retained intended applications as constitutive parts of theories and has faced extensive criticism for doing so.
